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Who killed the inner circle?

ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the properties of the board interlock network connecting the largest American
corporations between 1999 and 2009. We find that the former stability of the network—in which a
handful of banks and multinationals held positions at the center, a few dozen directors served on a large
number of boards, and thus the distance between any two companies or directors was short—has
largely collapsed during the past decade. There is no longer a stable core of companies that reliably
occupies a center, and the mean geodesic has gone up continuously since 2002. The proximal cause is
that no cohort of super-connector directors has arisen to take the place of those who have retired. This
contrasts with prior generations, in which ambitious individuals sought out multiple board seats for the
benefits they provided in status, business connections, and monetary compensation. We speculate that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, along with other corporate governance reforms, has made serving on several
boards costly, resulting in the decline in one of sociology’s most-studied networks.

Who killed the inner circle?
Since the merger wave at the turn of the 20th century that gave birth to the modern American
corporation, corporate boards have shared directors. The result is a large and inclusive interlock
network that connects nearly every major corporation and nearly every director into a single
more-or-less cohesive social structure. Interlock ties among corporations are largely fortuitous—boards
recruit directors, not interlocks—but consequential. Directors bring insights gained on one board to bear
on the decisions made on other boards. This has two implications: First, directors who serve on multiple
boards may be particularly valuable because they provide a mechanism for vicarious learning and a
conduit to best practices. Like phones and fax machines, directors are subject to network externalities:
the more boards they serve on, the greater the benefit they bring. Second, widespread sharing of
directors among boards creates a substrate for the rapid diffusion of information and practices, such as
devices to defend against unwanted takeover or views about which Senate candidates to support
(Mizruchi, 1996). Through monthly board meetings, a flu virus that infected a JP Morgan Chase board
meeting in January 2001 could have spread via shared directors to 90% of the Fortune 1000 by May
(Davis, Yoo and Baker, 2003). The small diameter of the interlock network, created by directors who
serve on multiple boards, has been one of its most durable features.
The existence of an elite “inner circle” of directors who serve on many corporate boards has intrigued
sociologists for decades (e.g., Useem, 1984). Who were these people, and how did they get there? For
ambitious people, the attraction of serving on corporate boards was straightforward: the pay was good,
the workload modest, and there were benefits in status and connections to serving on as many
reputable boards as possible. Moreover, this inner circle played a particularly critical role in knitting
together the broader business elite into a more-or-less coherent class, creating the network shortcuts
that made the corporate elite into a small world (Davis et al., 2003).
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In recent years, however, the attraction of serving on corporate boards has been diminished by a series
of scandals and crises that have made board service less of a sinecure and more of a burden. The
enhanced scrutiny of directors by analysts, the press, and institutional investors, and the increased legal
liability imposed by corporate governance reforms over the past decade, may have turned the inner
sanctum into an empty room.
In this paper, we briefly review findings on the American interlock network and its dynamics,
highlighting some of its enduring regularities. We also describe some of the challenges, from corporate
scandals and new regulation to financial crises, to this network’s cohesiveness that have arisen since the
turn of the 21st century. Next, we compile and analyze data on the boards of every firm in the S&P 500
from 1999 to 2009. We report three broad sets of findings. First, there was nearly complete turnover
among the 25 most central corporations during this time. In contrast to what was true for almost the
entire 20th century, neither banks nor any other type of firm occupied a stable center. Second, the inner
circle of well-connected directors has largely disappeared. Whereas in prior years dozens of directors
routinely served on five or more corporate boards, we find that by 2009 three directors served on five
boards each, and only one served on six. Third, as a result of the disappearance of the inner circle, the
mean geodesic has increased notably. Time series data suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may
have been the most significant factor in killing off the inner circle.

The American interlock network in the 20th century
For over a century, scholars and policymakers have been intrigued by the interlock network created
through directors who serve on multiple corporate boards. In 1905 Otto Jeidels, scion of a Frankfurt
banking family, documented how German banks placed their directors on the boards of industrial
companies while also offering directorships “to persons of title, also to ex-civil servants, who are able to
do a great deal to facilitate relations with the authorities.” In the US, Louis Brandeis published a series of
articles in Harper’s showing the workings of a “Money Trust” that dominated American industry through
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control of lending and through bankers placed on the boards of their subject companies. In his
memorable phrasing, “The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws
human and divine...It is the most potent instrument of the Money Trust” (Brandeis, 1914: 51). At
roughly the same time, Lenin (1916) claimed that bank control of the largest corporations was a
common feature of advanced industrial economies, including Germany, France, and the US, and he
pointed to the pervasive bank-centered interlock networks as one of its signal elements. Oligopoly in
industry was accompanied by oligopoly in banking, and the two were connected via shared directors.
For decades afterwards, overlapping memberships on corporate boards was taken as evidence of a
more-or-less cohesive power elite (e.g., Mills, 1956; Useem, 1984), with particular kinds of people
(corporate diplomats) and particular kinds of organizations (banks) playing central roles in holding the
network together. From Mills (1956) onward, the interlock network was a seedbed for network thinking
in sociology.
Researchers have discovered three kinds of regularities in the interlock network in the US. First, since
the turn of the 20th century when the interlock network first arose, commercial banks have been the
most central nodes (Mizruchi, 1982). Early on, banks were central because they placed their officers on
the boards of other companies—for instance, President George Baker of New York’s First National Bank
(predecessor of Citigroup) personally served on 22 corporate boards (Brandeis, 1914). As corporations
grew larger and came to rely largely on their own earnings for financing, however, the flow of directors
was reversed, and banks began to recruit well-connected CEOs and other elites to serve as outside
directors on their own boards to provide wide-ranging economic intelligence to guide lending (Mintz
and Schwartz, 1985). Money center bank boards, in short, formed a reliable core at the center of the
interlock network.
Second, there was an identifiable “Inner Circle” of directors who were particularly important to the
dynamics of the network. The vast majority of directors served on only one corporate board, but a small
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number served on many boards and spanned the corporate, non-profit, and policy worlds. According to
Mike Useem (1984), these “corporate diplomats” had a distinctively cosmopolitan outlook that
encompassed the broad interests of business rather than just the interests of a particular sector, and
they were more likely than other directors to participate in policy organizations and to serve stints in
public service (before or after their director careers).
Third, the interlock network had an uncanny “small world” property in which everybody seemed to
know everybody else, or to have friends in common. “As an elite, it is not organized, although its
members often seem to know one another, seem quite naturally to work together, and share many
organizations in common. There is nothing conspiratorial about it, although its decisions are often
publicly unknown and its mode of operation manipulative rather than explicit” (Mills, 1956: 294). With
the advent of advanced network methods and computing power, it became possible to quantify Mills’s
observation: on average, the 6000 directors on major corporate boards in 1982 could reach each other
in about four steps through shared board memberships (Davis, Yoo and Baker 2003: Table 2), and for
those on the board of JP Morgan Chase the distance was substantially shorter. Among elites, it was a
small world after all.
These empirical regularities varied in how stable they were over time. The chronic centrality of
commercial banks began to decline in the 1980s, and by the late 1990s banks no longer dominated the
ranks of the most central firms. There were two reasons for this: First, as corporations increasingly
turned to financial markets rather than banks for their debt, commercial banks began to look to other
markets, shrank their boards, and reduced their recruiting of well-connected executives (Davis and
Mizruchi, 1999). Second, as the banking industry began to consolidate across geographic and industrial
lines, there were simply fewer commercial banks to go around (Neuman et al., 2008).
The path to the inner circle had also changed. When Mills wrote The Power Elite in 1956, the inner circle
was almost exclusively white, male, and “well-bred.” The old boys’ club was exactly that. Even as late as
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the 1980s, the corporate elite was tilted heavily toward the graduates of fancy prep schools and Ivy
League colleges (Useem, 1984). But societal pressures for diverse representation on corporate
boards—coupled with the tendency of boards to recruit from among candidates that they already
knew—ended up promoting a handful of “demographically attractive” directors into the inner circle. By
1999, many corporate diplomats were women, and four of the ten best-connected directors were
African-American, including the director that served on the largest number of boards by far, Vernon
Jordan. (Jordan was perhaps best known as Bill Clinton’s best friend and regular golf partner.) It
appeared that the quickest path to the inner circle was to be female and/or minority and to serve in a
Presidential administration—preferably a Republican one. A subsequent appointment to one corporate
board often led to invitations to join several more (Davis et al., 2003). Thus, the demography of the
inner circle had changed fairly dramatically after the 1980s.
In contrast, the “small worldness” of the interlock network appeared to be an ironclad law that operated
independent of these other features. Davis et al. (2003) reported that the average geodesic among the
largest 600 or so US corporations was 3.38 in 1982, 3.46 in 1990, and 3.46 in 1999, while the geodesic
among directors was 4.27, 4.30, and 4.33 respectively—in spite of the high turnover among the
constituent companies and the nearly complete turnover in individual dIrectors during this 18-year
period. It appeared that the short geodesics that characterized the interlock network were impervious
to turnover among the constituent nodes.
Since the turn of the 21st century, there have arisen several potential challenges to the structure of the
interlock network in the US. From the perspective of directors, three events have reduced the
attractiveness of serving on corporate boards. The Nasdaq crash of March 2000 was followed by a series
of scandals that revealed rampant conflicts of interest in the system of corporate financing in the United
States and subjected dozens of corporate boards to embarrassing shareholder lawsuits. In response,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 with near-unanimous votes in the House and
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Senate. SOX was perceived to have greatly increased the accountability of corporate boards, particularly
for directors serving on the audit committee, and to have further decreased the attraction of board
service. Finally, the Great Recession that began in 2007 and the accompanying market decline brought
increased pressures on directors. In combination, these events considerably dimmed the attraction of
being a director, particularly on multiple boards.
The first decade of the 21st century also saw the movement toward bank consolidation become nearly
complete, as the surviving big four commercial banks (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and
Wells Fargo) acquired many of their remaining rivals. The financial crisis of 2008 created additional
pressures for consolidation, as distressed banks (Wachovia, Washington Mutual, National City, and
others) were pushed into mergers with their larger rivals.
Finally, there has been a more diffuse decline of the corporate system. By 2009, the US had half as many
public corporations as it had in 1997, as the number of initial public offerings failed to keep up with
acquisitions, delistings, and acquisitions (Davis, 2011). The so-called “twilight of the public corporation”
and the rise of alternative forms of financing such as private equity suggested that perhaps the interlock
network was a peculiar feature of 20th century corporate economy rather than a permanent fixture of
capitalism.
This paper examines each of the three network dimensions during the 2000s, describing changes in
which corporations are most central, who are the members of the inner circle, and how small is the
small world of the corporate elite. In each case, we uncover notable changes in the composition and
structure of the corporate network.

Sample and data
We examined company and director interlocks between S&P 500 companies annually from 1999 to 2009.
This period encompasses events such as the dot-com crash, Enron and other accounting scandals,
introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley regulation, 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, the subprime mortgage
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crisis and the collapse of the automakers.

For each calendar year, we created the list of companies that were on the S&P 500 at any point during
the year. Standard and Poors occasionally changes the constituents of the S&P 500 index, typically due
to mergers and bankruptcies. During the period under study, there were 329 such changes, for an
average of just under 30 changes (6% turnover) per year. The year 2000 saw the most changes in the
index with 53 and 2003 the fewest with 9. Our sample includes 829 distinct companies and 5,300
company-years.

For each year, we created the list of board interlocks—companies sharing a director—that existed
between companies in the sample for that year. This list included all interlocks that existed at any point
during that calendar year. Our sample consisted of 43,614 corporate interlock-years, for an average of
just under 4,000 interlocks per year.

We also created a list of director interlocks—directors serving together on the same S&P 500 board.
There were 9,615 unique directors and 49,435 director-years in our sample. The list includes 803,597
director interlock-years, for an average of slightly over 73,000 interlocks per year. We are in the process
of gathering demographic data on the age, gender and ethnicity of the directors in our sample.

We created these lists with interlock data from Boardex, selecting the companies in our sample by
matching to Compustat S&P 500 historical constituent lists using Committee on Uniform Security
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers. Companies’ CUSIP numbers can change, so we used CRSP
name event data to create a lookup between the CUSIP numbers listed by Compustat in its S&P 500 data
and Boardex internal unique identifiers for each company. The Boardex data have two major drawbacks.
First, data coverage is incomplete for firms and individuals that were not active into the late 2000s.
Accordingly, while we expect our main conclusions below to hold, some of the specific statistics
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reported may change as we track down missing data. Second, Boardex does not contain CUSIP data for
all companies in its dataset. We manually inserted lookup values where this was the case for a company
in our S&P 500 sample. We also manually corrected for inconsistencies between how Boardex and CRSP
handled identifiers before and after mergers. Notwithstanding the incomplete coverage and need for
manual linking to CRSP data, Boardex provides a singularly useful dataset for exploring board interlocks.
Companies and directors are each assigned unique identifiers within the database, and these identifiers
are used consistently. This obviates the need to manually check for different people with the same
name or the same person listed under different names.

Findings
There has been significant turnover in the ranks of the most-connected companies. Of the top 13
companies with the most direct board links within the S&P 500 in 2001 (top 10 including ties), only
Procter & Gamble remained in the top 10 in 2009. Indeed, among the top 10 in 2001, only P&G, Pfizer
and SBC Communications (renamed to AT&T Inc.) remained in the top 15 in 2009. When ranked by
eigenvector centrality instead of degree, Procter & Gamble is again the only top 10 company from 2001
to remain in the top 10 in 2009. Only Pfizer, Verizon Communications, and Dell join P&G as top 10
eigenvector central companies remaining in the top 25 in 2009.

We could not discern an obvious pattern in the types of companies that were most central in the 2009
interlock network. Banks and financial institutions certainly were not the linchpins in either 2001 or
2009. One trend may be the rising prevalence within the most-connected ranks of companies with a
global rather than U.S. domestic focus.

The connectedness of the most-connected companies has also declined. Whereas the highest-degree
company in 2001 had 30 direct ties, the most-connected company in 2009 had only 23. (The comparable
figure in 1982 was 48—see Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). To break into the top 25 in 2001 required 20
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direct ties to other S&P 500 companies; in 2009, 14 ties was enough.

[Table 1 about here]

There has also been significant turnover in the most-connected directors. Of the top 11 highest-degree
directors in 2001, only James Cash, Jr. remains in the top 10 in 2009, and only William Gray III from the
2001 top 10 joins Cash in the 2009 top 25. Measured by eigenvector centrality, the turnover is even
more severe. None of the 2001 top 10 directors remains in the top 25 in 2009. Indeed, there is no
overlap between the top 25 in 2001 and 2009.

In 2001, the most-connected directors were more likely ethnicity than the director population at large to
be female or from a minority. This trend seems unchanged in 2009. In 2001, there was one woman
(Helene Kaplan) in the top 10 for degree and eigenvector centrality. The top 10 degree centrality list also
contained three African-American males and one Hispanic male. The top 10 eigenvector centrality list
contained three black males. In 2009, there were three black males, one black female, one Hispanic
male and one white female in the top-10 degree centrality list, and two black males, one Hispanic male
and one Hispanic female in the top-10 eigenvector centrality list. Similarly, there seems to be no
significant change in average ages of the most-connected directors between 2001 and 2009. In 2001,
the average ages of the top 10 (including ties) most-connected directors by degree centrality and
eigenvector centrality were 65.1 and 64.7 respectively. In 2009, these figures changed slightly to 63.4
and 64.4.

Mirroring the declining centrality among the most-connected companies, the centrality of the
most-connected directors has also declined dramatically. In 2001, Senator George Mitchell III had the
highest degree, sitting on the same boards with 101 other S&P 500 directors. In 2009, the
highest-degree director was Dr. Shirley Jackson with 73 ties. The number of direct ties needed to break
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into the top 25 decreased from 60 to 45.

[Table 2 about here]

Our most striking finding is the decline in the S&P 500 interlock network’s overall connectedness, as
measured by the mean geodesic (shortest path). Such large fluctuations have not been observed in the
many studies of U.S. corporate elite networks to date. The mean geodesic in the corporate interlock
network’s main component increased from 3.38 in 1999 to 3.91 in 2009. This upward trend began in
2002 (i.e., around the time of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and continued into 2009.

Figure 1. S&P 500 company interlock average geodesic in main component 1999-2009
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Contributing to this increase in path lengths was a marked downward shift in the number of direct
interlock ties between companies and directors. Figures 2 and 3 show the degree distributions for
companies and directors for 2001 and 2009. During this period, the average degree for companies fell
from 3.30 to 2.64. There were 22 companies with more than 20 interlock ties in 2001, and AT&T
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Corporation and J.P. Morgan Chase and Co. had the most ties to other S&P 500 companies with 30 and
29 respectively. By 2009, there was only one company with more than 20 interlock ties—Procter &
Gamble with 23. For the director network, the average degree changed from 16.1 to 14.0. While there
were 24 directors with more than 60 direct ties in 2001, there was only one in 2009. The
most-connected director in 2001 had 101 ties, while the most-connected in 2009 had 73.

Figure 2. Degree distributions for companies, 2001 and 2009
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Figure 3. Degree distributions for directors, 2001 and 2009
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The increased distance between companies in the interlock network was not caused by a change in
board sizes. Board sizes increased from an average of 8.9 directors per board in 2001 to 9.3 in 2009.
Instead, the decline in connectedness was due to the fact that the top directors served on fewer boards
in 2009 compared to 2001. The average number of directorships per S&P 500 director fell slightly from
1.32 to 1.25 from 2001 to 2009. More dramatic was the disappearance of “super-connectors” during
this period. While in 2001, several individuals sat on seven S&P 500 boards, by 2009 there were no
individuals sitting on seven boards. The number of directors who sat on six or more S&P 500 boards
decreased from 12 to one, and the number on five or more boards from 37 to four. (By comparison, in
1982, there were six directors who served on seven boards, 15 that served on six, and 41 that served on
five.)

Figure 4. Number of directorships distribution, 2001 and 2009
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Age and retirement played a role in the diminishing connectedness of the 2001 super-connector director
cohort. For the 12 directors with six or more S&P board seats in 2001, the median age in 2001 was
63—close to the standard retirement age. It is telling that the three youngest directors among these
dozen—William Gray III, James Cash Jr. and Shirley Jackson—all continued to have four or more S&P 500
directorships in 2009.

Figure 5. Net decrease in number of board seats by 2001 versus age (among directors with 6 or
more directorships in 2001)
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Director turnover is nothing new, of course, and in the past the retiring super-connectors were replaced
by new cohorts of super-connectors, who helped maintain the stability of the overall network. Why did
no new super-connectors arise in the 2000s to replace those who retired? This is an intriguing question
for future empirical study.

Discussion and Conclusion
We discovered several changes in the S&P 500 interlock network during the period between 2001 and
2009. Some changes were expected, such as the extensive turnover in the identities of the
most-connected companies and individuals. Retirement due to old age seems to be a key driver of
turnover in the ranks of most-connected directors.

Other changes were surprising. For the first time since the early twentieth century, the network has
started to lose its characteristic connectivity. Average geodesics—distances between companies and
directors—increased by a magnitude that had not been observed before. Indeed, previous studies had
found that the interlock network displayed a remarkably constant level of closeness, suggestive of a
homeostatic equilibrium enforced by the underlying dynamics of network formation (Davis et al., 2003).
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Our findings suggest a shift in the underlying dynamics of the network. All previous studies of interlock
networks that we are aware of have found super-connectors—individuals who served on a large number
of boards, and boards that served as meeting places for well-connected directors. From the 1900s to the
1980s, bank boards served as the meeting places of CEOs and bank directors served as linchpins in the
interlock network. More recently, a handful of sought-after directors—often women and
under-represented minorities holding high positions in government and civil society—have served as the
super-connectors. The disappearance of super-connectors may indicate that preferential attachment
(Barabasi, 2002) is no longer a meaningful predictor of interlock network tie formation. That is,
companies may no longer prefer well-connected directors and potential directors may not prefer
well-connected boards. To the extent that serving on multiple boards is no longer attractive, the career
dynamics that previously underlaid the structure of the interlock network are undermined. Ambitious
individuals may no longer accept invitations to join the boards of banks or other portals to the inner
circle, because the rewards for being a super-connector are outweighed by the costs. Thus, the network
loses its cohesion.

Several events in the early 2000s made being a super-connector director less attractive for individuals,
and super-connector directors less attractive to companies. Serving on multiple boards became less
attractive after the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley regulation in 2002 and the attendant increase in workload
and legal liability for directors. Heightened airport security in response to terrorist attacks made even
first-class travel less palatable. Companies faced increased scrutiny from the press, analysts and
shareholders on director appointments. Some of this scrutiny explicitly criticized the hiring of
super-connector directors. For example, Forbes began to issue an annual “Overworked Directors” list,
containing information on the directors with the most S&P 500 board memberships and the boards that
hired them.
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Was the influence of these (and other) factors strong enough to permanently change the tie formation
dynamics of the interlock network? Have super-connectors truly gone the way of the dodo? What does
this tell us about the cohesiveness of the American elite?

There are at least three possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive. First, we may merely be
observing a temporary blip as the interlock network transitions from centering around a particular set of
individuals to centering around the next set of super-connectors. In a few years, the next generation of
super-connectors may emerge from among the younger directors who are currently accumulating
directorships.

Second, super-connectors may have disappeared because the corporate elite has fragmented.
Corporate CEOs and board members may no longer desire to be strongly-linked to each other. Mizruchi
(2010) asserts that a moderate, highly-connected and influential core of business leaders—the
corporate elite—continually existed from the early 20th century, but disappeared in the 1990s. In his
view, an “active state, powerful labor, and a financial community whose interests transcended those of
particular firms or sectors” forced the corporate elite to unite and defend the corporate system. In the
1980s, the moderating influences of the state, labor and commercial banks were weakened, and instead
“shareholder value” became the dominant logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). Institutional investors
(Useem, 1996), financial analysts (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005) and the capital market itself (Davis, 2009)
came to exert control on CEOs. On one hand, the corporate elite had won the war, and the American
corporate system had become a taken-for-granted institution, an ideological tautology. Attempts by
lenders, labor or government to place restrictions on corporations were now deemed ill-advised, even
unpatriotic. On the other hand, CEOs’ new shareholder value master proved to be a tyrant. Public
company CEOs lost power, prestige and job security, and found themselves scrambling to survive
individually by capturing more market value for their individual firms. CEOs no longer had the need nor

17

the motivation to band together to defend their interests as a class.

A final possibility is that the breakdown of the interlock network may signal a shift in form but not the
function of elite ties—the connections may still be happening, just not in the form of public company
interlocks. Corporate interlocks may have served a functional purpose for elite cohesion, but the appeal
of this particular mechanism may have faded and other mechanisms may now connect the American
elite. We should then look for burgeoning elite networks in other fora, such as private equity,
non-profits, clubs, events or the equivalents of Facebook for the rich and famous.

If elites are shifting participation from corporate boards to other milieux, this may be a signal—cause
and symptom—of a broader shift away from a corporate-centered society (Davis, 2009). Organization
theorists have (perhaps self-servedly) argued that we live in a “society of organizations”. For example,
Perrow (1991) claimed that large bureaucracies had absorbed society, and that understanding the
corporation was equivalent to understanding American society. Others have argued that this is no
longer true. We now live in a world of transient organizational identification (Wal-Mart, America’s
largest employer, has 40% annual turnover) and smaller, less permanent and less clearly-demarcated
companies. American society is no longer defined by its large organizations.

Perhaps, then, the disappearance of super-connectors in the interlock network is more akin to the
extinction of ammonites (which died out with the dinosaurs) than dodos. The breakdown of the
interlock network may be an indicator of an ecological shift in the makeup of society. As the age of
corporations fades away, the new network center may show us where our society is heading.
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Table 1. Most-connected companies, 2001 and 2009

2001
Top-25 (including ties) degree centrality companies
Degree
30
29
27
25

24
23

22

21

20

Top-25 eigenvector centrality companies

Company
AT&T CORP
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
PFIZER INC
XEROX CORP
EXXON MOBIL CORP
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC
SARA LEE CORP
SBC COMMUNICATIONS
AMR CORP
CUMMINS INC
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO
PEPSICO INC
CATERPILLAR INC
CITIGROUP INC
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO
DELL COMPUTER CORP
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
KROGER CO
SUNOCO INC
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO
BELLSOUTH CORP
DELTA AIR LINES INC
GEORGIA PACIFIC GROUP
VULCAN MATERIALS

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Company
AT&T CORP
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
XEROX CORP
PFIZER INC
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC
EXXON MOBIL CORP
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO
DELL COMPUTER CORP
SARA LEE CORP
PEPSICO INC
AMR CORP
SBC COMMUNICATIONS
CITIGROUP INC
DELTA AIR LINES INC
AOL TIME WARNER INC
GEORGIA PACIFIC GROUP
CUMMINS INC
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO
UNITED STATES STEEL CORP
FANNIE MAE
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Company
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP
3M CO (Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co)
MARATHON OIL CORP
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP
DEERE & CO
ELI LILLY & CO
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
MCDONALD'S CORP
NORTHERN TRUST CORP
CITIGROUP INC
AON CORP
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
CATERPILLAR INC
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC
FEDEX CORP
PFIZER INC
DELL INC (Dell Computer Corp)
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC
CHEVRON CORP
BANK OF AMERICA CORP
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
WELLS FARGO & CO
INTUIT INC

2009
Degree Company
23
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
20
MARATHON OIL CORP
ELI LILLY & CO
18
3M CO (Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co)
NORTHERN TRUST CORP
BANK OF AMERICA CORP
CITIGROUP INC
DEERE & CO
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP
17
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
MCDONALD'S CORP
16
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
15
SCHERING-PLOUGH CORP
PFIZER INC
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL INC
AT&T INC (SBC Communications)
WELLS FARGO & CO
14
GENERAL MILLS INC
CATERPILLAR INC
FEDEX CORP
TIME WARNER INC (AOL Time Warner Inc)
AON CORP
INTUIT INC
YAHOO INC
KROGER CO

20

Table 2. Most-connected directors, 2001 and 2009
2001
Top-25 degree centrality directors
Degree
101
80
77
76
75

73
72
71
70

69
67
66

64
63
62
61
60

Top-25 eigenvector centrality directors

Company
George Mitchell Jr
Vernon Jordan Jr
William Gray III
Edward Whitacre Jr
James Cash Jr
William Howell
Helene Kaplan
Carl Reichardt
Claudio Gonzalez Laporte
John Clendenin
Charles Knight
Sam Nunn Jr
Jack Breen
Frank Raines
Ann Korologos
The Hon. John Snow
Michael Miles
Franklin Thomas
Martin Walker
Donald McHenry
Russell Palmer
William Johnson
James Zimmerman
Kenneth Derr
Joe Neubauer

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Company
Helene Kaplan
Edward Whitacre Jr
Russell Palmer
Charles Knight
John Stafford
William Gray III
Donald McHenry
Robert Storey
Douglas Warner III
William Howell
Mitchel Burns
Lynn Martin
Frank Raines
Jess Hay
Bobby Inman
Joe Neubauer
Walter Shipley
Charles Lee
August Busch III
John Snow
Ivan Seidenberg
Don Fites
Hugh Price
Laura Tyson
Vernon Jordan Jr

2009
Degree Company
73
Shirley Jackson
60
Charles Lee
Suzanne Nora Johnson
59
Virgis Colbert
58
Sam Nunn Jr
56
Enrique Hernandez Jr
55
Robert Ryan
53
Richard Myers
Robert Lane
52
James Cash Jr
51
William Gray III
50
Carol Bartz
49
Anne Mulcahy
William Osborn
Lynn Martin
48
Joseph Prueher
Tony Earley Jr
46
Donald Rice
Thomas Ryan
Jackie Ward
Dick Parsons
Thomas Usher
Charlene Barshefsky
Basil Anderson
45
Hansel Tookes II

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2125

Company
Enrique Hernandez Jr
Walter Massey
Donald Rice
Virgis Colbert
Monica Lozano
Thomas Ryan
Chad Gifford
Joseph Prueher
Bob Joss
Charles Rossotti
Gary Countryman
Stephen Sanger
Kenneth Lewis
Thomas May
Frank Bramble Sr
Richard McCormick
John Chen
Don James
Jackie Ward
John Baker II
Chad Holliday Jr
William Barnet III
John Collins
Tommy Franks
Susan Engel

